Introduction
Selection disputes inevitably arise prior to any major games such as an Olympics. Prior to the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, some 25 disputes were heard in Canada. 1 In anticipation of the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, an ad-hoc arbitration system was put in place in Canada to deal with these disputes. To assist the roster of adjudicators appointed to hear these matters, the Centre for Sport and Law 2 compiled and reviewed some 30 sport selection disputes from Canadian courts and tribunals. In this article, we summarize the legal basis for decision-making in sport and present some key themes that emerged from the review of these cases.
Sport Adjudications -the Legal Basis
The vast majority of Canadian sport organizations and clubs are 'private tribunals'. They are not statutorily-based and as such, they are autonomous and self-governing associations. They have the power to make rules and regulations that affect people -specifically, their members and participants in their sporting activities. 3 Historically, the courts have been reluctant to interfere in the affairs of private tribunals. The relationship among members of a private tribunal, or association, 4 was viewed as personal, particularly where membership in the association was voluntary. Within such associations, membership rights had to somehow be bound to property rights (no matter how removed such property rights might be from the actual issue in dispute), in order for the courts to intervene (Hopkinson v [1952] 2 QB 329 (C.A.), hereafter referred to as 'Lee', precipitated a radical change in this 'hands-off' approach. The Court of Appeal in the Lee case unanimously held that it had the jurisdiction to review any decision of an organization (in this case, a trade union) that involved a question of law, including any question of interpretation of the association's constitution.
In Canada, Lee is viewed as a starting point when considering the legal context for decision-making within sport organizations. 5 Athletes, and others, seeking legal remedies for the adverse effects of decisions of their sport governing bodies have, almost without exception, relied upon the principles set out in Lee.
In his article 'Denning's Revenge: Judicial Formalism and the Application of Procedural Fairness to Internal Union Hearings', Michael Lynk identified four significant themes in Denning's judgment. 6 These themes are summarized below.
First, Denning confirmed an emerging trend away from judicial intervention based solely on property rights towards one based on contract law. Essentially, Denning viewed an association's constitution to be a contract among the association's members. This contract, expressed through the association's governing documents, 7 enabled the association and its members to establish the rights, privileges and obligations of membership in order to better regulate the affairs of the association and its members.
Secondly, Denning significantly enlarged the basis for judicial intervention beyond simply judicial review to a point as 'intrusive as full appellate review'. 8 The test for judicial intervention, Denning wrote, was one of 'true construction' -that is, had the association given the correct interpretation to its own rules according to what the courts viewed as the right interpretation? (Lee at 343-344).
Thirdly, Denning distinguished between different types of associations for the purposes of setting a threshold for judicial intervention in the regulation of the association's internal affairs. Denning distinguished between associations that could have a significant effect on an individual's livelihood (such as trade unions and professional associations) and those that did not have any particular economic impact on an individual (such as social clubs). Denning recognized that these two types of associations were subject to different degrees of judicial intervention.
Denning's fourth theme affirmed and emphasized the application of the rules of natural justice to the internal decision-making responsibilities of private tribunals and made the courts the final judge as to whether or not such rules were properly applied. In Lee, Denning wrote: 'Although the jurisdiction of a domestic tribunal is founded on contract, express or implied, nevertheless the parties are not free to make any contract they like. There are important limitations imposed by public policy. The tribunal must for instance, observe the principles of natural justice' (Lee per Lord Denning M.R. at 342).
All four themes resonate for legal decision-making in sport. Adjudicators in sport disputes have incorporated these four principles into their decision-making -it is universally accepted in the Canadian sport context that sport organizations are private tribunals (Denning's first theme), that their bylaws and policies form a contract with their members (Denning's first theme), and that rules of natural justice, or procedural fairness, apply (Denning's fourth theme). 9 While the principles underlying Denning's themes have been incorporated into Canadian decision-making in sport, none of the themes has received the degree of scrutiny and analysis that are necessary for their consistent interpretation across a wide range of sport environments or circumstances.
The While Canadian law under Mossop suggests that the standard of correctness is generally appropriate for sport decisions, it is worth noting that the governing documents forming the contract between the sport association and its members are often not prepared by persons expert in drafting. As well, these governing documents (particularly a constitution and bylaws) are long-term and enduring in nature, thus perhaps ought not to be interpreted as one would interpret a contract that may be changed easily by the parties. Lynk 10 has identified a number of Canadian statutory tribunals that have, in fact, adopted a standard of review of 'substantial compliance' with natural justice which he suggests is more realistic. Continuing to use a standard of review of correctness may lead to an outcome vastly different than that originally intended by the governing documents, and at times, even an absurd outcome.
The third theme in Lee, that the threshold for judicial intervention depended on the nature of the private tribunal, has also not been considered fully in the sport context. Denning wrote his 1952 judgment in the context of a trade union. However, he recognized a range of tribunals, from those affecting a person's livelihood to those that catered to a person's need for social interaction, recreation and entertainment. Sport itself exists along this same continuum -from the local golf club an individual might choose to join for recreational and social purposes (Barrie v. Royal Colwood Golf Club, 9 August 2001, unreported decision B.C.S.C. (Victoria), Docket No. 01-2857) to the national sport governing body whose members include elite athletes who receive financial support from the Federal government and significant income from sponsorship and endorsements. Does a national sport association which is responsible for elite athletes fall fully or partially within Denning's category of trade unions or professional organizations that have the ability to control a person's livelihood? A national sport organization can perhaps be likened to a 'monopoly'. Such an organization is recognized by an international sport federation as having exclusive responsibility for governing a particular sport within a particular country. This responsibility is reinforced by the state which recognizes and funds one governing organization per sport. In order to compete within that sport at the national or international level, an athlete must be a member of that national governing body and must participate in the sport pursuant to its rules, thus for all intents and purposes removing the 'voluntary' nature of membership. Furthermore, at the elite level, such athletes also earn significant revenue from the sport, through financial assistance from the government and from private sponsors, and through endorsements and appearance fees. In a growing number of cases the high performance amateur athlete within that sport organization is only notionally amateur -a more appropriate term to describe their status is that of 'commercial athlete'. This athlete earns a livelihood in sport, and to do so must participate and compete within the monopolistic rules of a sport governing body.
This analysis has not been incorporated into Canadian decision-making, yet it has significant implications for determining the extent of judicial intervention in the decisions of private sport organizations, and the corresponding expectations for procedural fairness.
The nature of the association as described above interacts directly with Denning's fourth theme, which is that the requirements of natural justice will also vary depending on factors including, among others, the nature of the private tribunal, the nature of the dispute, the extent to which the effect of the decision has serious consequences, and the finality of that decision (Martineau v. Mataqui Institution [1980] 11 'the more interesting problem lies in determining just in what way the rules of natural justice will be imposed upon the contract that regulates the decision-making power of the domestic tribunal'. This notion has received little, if any analytical attention in the sport literature. 12 In conclusion, while the principles from the Lee decision are an integral part of the Canadian jurisprudence arising from sport disputes, the application of these principles and their resultant effect have not been well-articulated in the sport context. Not all sport disputes merit the same considerations as to the requirements of procedural fairness. The concept of procedural fairness is flexible and sport organizations and sport disputes range along a diverse continuum. Depending on the type of association (social/recreational club or monopolistic sport governing body), the level of athlete performance (recreational or elite) and the nature of the dispute (whether or not it impinges on the athlete's ability to earn a livelihood), adjudicators will have to find the appropriate measures or safeguards that are required to satisfy the duty of fairness in the particular case they are deciding.
Recent Canadian Developments
On 10 April 2002 a statute was introduced in the Canadian legislature that will create a Sport Dispute Resolution Centre. 13 This Centre will provide alternate dispute resolution (ADR) services to the national sport community as well as resources to assist national associations to better manage their own disputes internally. Within the legislation, 'disputes' are limited to disagreements related to doping, disagreements among sport associations and disagreements between a sport association and persons affiliated with it, including members such as athletes.
As a precursor to the ADR system proposed in the legislation, and in anticipation of disputes preceding the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games, an interim mechanism incorporating arbitration and mediation was launched in Canada in December 2001 (the ADR Sport RED).
14 This interim program was voluntary and was not intended to replace the internal dispute management mechanisms of sport governing bodies. Rather, it was intended to provide a venue of last resort for lingering disputes or alternatively, a mechanism that the parties could agree to use in place of the association's internal review and appeal procedures. 15 The rules presently devised for the interim ADR Sport RED system 16 created significant challenges for adjudicators as these rules did not adequately mesh with the various internal dispute resolution policies and procedures of national sport governing bodies, and whether the system was being used as a venue for final arbitration, or as a substitute for an association's internal hearing process.
More specifically, the rules currently in force in the ADR Sport RED program provide for a hearing de novo, 17 and place no restrictions on the authority of the adjudicator. 18 There are no restrictions on the scope of review -that is, a matter may be referred to an adjudicator on its substance and merits, as opposed to limiting disputes to those where there are allegations of errors in procedure or jurisdiction. The broad scope of these rules potentially conflicted with the more narrow procedures articulated under specific national sport organizations' internal policies. Thus, where the scope of authority of the adjudicator was limited within the association's policies, no such restrictions were placed on the adjudicator in the final arbitration. This created a situation where adjudicators could make decisions that went well beyond what the association intended through its policies. In the handful of cases that were heard, the parties had to resolve these conflicts between their own rules and the ADR Sport RED rules on a case-by-case basis as preliminary matters (Gagnon et. al 
. and CrossCountry Canada -Ski de fond Canada 13 December 2001, arbitration award pursuant to Draft CAS (Court of Arbitration for Sport) Code).
Where the interim system was used to replace the internal policies of the association, a different problem arose. Sport organizations adopt many different approaches for holding appeal hearings and managing disputes. Thus, one association may require that an appeal satisfy procedural grounds before it will be heard, while another association may place no restrictions on appeals that may be brought forward. 19 Likewise, in certain cases the authority of the appeal decision-maker will be limited so as not to exceed the authority of the original decision-maker, 20 whereas in others decisionmakers may probe the merits of the decision and replace the previous decision with their own. 21 These differences meant that sport associations that chose to use the ADR Sport RED system in place of their own systems, thus buying into the rules of the ADR Sport RED system, found themselves radically shifting away from their own policy directions. Once again, they gave adjudicators the ultimate authority to rewrite certain policies of the sport association.
Gearing up for Salt Lake City
As noted above, the ADR Sport RED system was launched on an interim basis in order to deal with Canadian team selection disputes before the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. Such disputes are common on the eve of a major games such as an Olympics, and in the past they had been accommodated through sport organization's internal appeal mechanisms, through private arbitration and through the courts. 22 To assist the adjudicators who might be called upon to deal with these disputes, the Centre for Sport and Law compiled and undertook an analysis of some 30 selection disputes in Canada. These included disputes heard in the courts as well as disputes decided by private tribunals, before either independent adjudicators or internal appeal panels. This review was important for two reasons: one, many selection decisions are technically complex, particularly in team sports; and two, the ADR Sport RED system afforded the adjudicators very broad discretion. This review was intended to identify some themes of potential interest to adjudicators, and to assist them in properly and consistently exercising their broad discretion in dealing with potentially complex disputes under very short time-lines. The remainder of this article summarizes the themes that were identified from these 30 cases.
The first theme is that a large number of disputes arise from the interpretation of the contract between sport associations and athletes. In many cases, sport administrators do not have expertise in bylaw and policy drafting. 23 Bylaws tend to be based upon generic templates designed to accommodate a wide range of general interest associations, and are often illsuited to the particular needs of a sport governing body overseeing the competitive activities of high performance athletes. As well, the 'members' of a sport association are often not individual athletes and coaches but rather provincial and territorial organizations or local clubs, thus creating some ambiguity as to whether the athlete participant is even subject to the authority of the organization's policies and procedures in the first place.
Specifically, policies relating to team eligibility, selection and appeals are written by people not skilled in draftsmanship. As a result, adjudicators will often have to interpret selection policies and criteria that are vague, incomplete, contradictory and even silent on critical points. For example, there is confusion between the authority to develop criteria and the authority to apply criteria, 24 tie breaker procedures do not actually work in breaking a tie; 25 the vagaries of weather or other unforeseen circumstances are not accommodated; 26 procedures for dealing with an appeal do not exist, requiring an ad-hoc procedure be improvised that is ultimately challenged; 27 performance criteria based on national and international standards are supposed to mesh together but do not; 28 criteria are not weighted relative to each other so those applying the criteria must make arbitrary decisions as to their relative weight; 29 changes are made to the selection process and these are not communicated to athletes 30 … The list continues. Adjudicators will find themselves having to make interpretations on these deficiencies that arise from the drafting of selection policies and criteria.
Several cases among the 30 that were reviewed involved adjudicators being asked to rewrite a selection policy in order to give it its intended meaning, or to substitute their own selection decision when the selection formula did not work as intended. 31 While this issue also has root in the poor drafting of selection policies and criteria, it does not arise from any ambiguity. Rather, the rules are clearly written but they produce a result not intended. As stated by the court in McCaig 'If the relief sought by the applicants were to be granted, it would, by necessary implication, require the court to write into the agreement a clause which does not exist. Apart from a claim of rectification, I know of no basis upon which a court can rewrite a contract by inserting a fresh clause in an agreement, no matter how desirable it might be' (McCaig per Simonson J. at 6). In the case of Roberge, the adjudicator wrote: 'It is not within the jurisdiction of the [appeal panel] to intervene into the affairs of [the sport association] and re-write their selection rules based on what the [appeal panel] thinks is fair, or what it thinks the criteria should be in order to select the best possible athlete' (Roberge per Arbitrator Kennedy at 6). It is not the adjudicator's role to fix drafting errors where there is no issue of interpretation -courts must give plain meaning to the words as written, even when they produce an unintended result.
A second theme is that many selection disputes arise from allegations of bias. 32 The sport community is small and many leaders within the community perform different roles at different times, and at times these roles may conflict. Athletes and coaches may have professional relationships that span many years, and coaches are often given responsibility to select athletes from among a group including athletes they coach currently or may have coached previously. As well, within sports that cater to small numbers, it is not uncommon to have a certain degree of parental involvement in leadership positions (such as Board member) which may be perceived as having some influence over decisions affecting national team athletes, including selection. It has been accepted that a degree of bias if often inevitable within small associations, and it is not necessary to force all internal hearings to an external forum simply on the basis of a perceived bias under such circumstances. 33 A third theme is that the sport system is hierarchical and the issue of which entity has jurisdiction may not be straightforward. It is widely understood that national sport associations 'select' national teams. For single sport international competitions and championships this is true, but in the multi-sport games setting (Olympics, Commonwealth Games, PanAmerican Games, World Student Games) this is in fact not true. Legally and technically, national sport organizations 'nominate' athletes to the national team but it is the multi-sport organization (Commonwealth Games Canada, Canadian Olympic Association, Canadian Interuniversity Sport) that actually 'names' the team and has ultimate responsibility for the members of the team. Thus, depending on the timing of the dispute, the authority to identify the team may rest with the national sport organization or with the multi-sport organization, or in the case of the Canada Games, with a provincial government. 34 Often, challenges to such decisions have been brought against the wrong entity, or have been brought against both entities, succeeding at one level but failing at another. 35 Similarly, an adjudicator appointed to hear a dispute between an athlete and the national sport organization may not have jurisdiction to bind the multi-sport organization. 36 A fourth theme is that the factual basis of many selection disputes is highly technical. Criteria to select athletes to individual sports are usually objective and straightforward -they include speed, time, placings, points, rankings -criteria that are all easily measured. Selecting athletes to team sports, or to sports that have both individual and team components, 37 often involves subjective criteria and thus requires a certain amount of discretion on the part of the selectors. Both objective criteria and subjective criteria may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances, but they give rise to vastly different disputes. Disputes involving objective criteria tend to revolve around their application and are technical in nature, 38 while disputes about subjective criteria and selection to teams tend to revolve around issues of bias and discretion. 39 Often, coaches are given broad discretion in selecting a team. As noted by the court in Kulesza, 40 coaches bring to this task their abundant technical knowledge and experience, as well as a thorough understanding of the strengths, weaknesses and attributes of the athletes seeking to be selected. Many selection disputes have revolved around whether or not a coach properly exercised his or her discretion in applying the subjective criteria and making a decision. 41 To say that a discretionary decision is arbitrary simply because a different coach would have arrived at a different decision does not mean that discretion has been exercised improperly. On the other hand, a selection approach based on no criteria whatsoever but only on a 'we know one [a good athlete] when we see one' kind of approach will not meet the test of procedural fairness and will be rejected. 42 A final theme observed from among the 30 cases reviewed is that many eligibility and selection disputes involve multiple and affected parties. 43 Selection disputes are not win-win scenarios: typically, only a finite number of individuals may be on a team (as determined by the rules of a national or international sport federation, or a national or international multi-sport organization) and the outcome of the dispute is invariably that one athlete will join the team and another athlete will not. If in an appeal, an adjudicator's decision results in placing a previously non-selected athlete (the appellant) on a team, an athlete actually selected to the team will have to be removed. The athlete removed from the team may then have a right to appeal -thus potentially beginning a vicious cycle of appeals.
Whether or not an individual should be included as an 'affected party' in a proceeding depends on the subject matter of the dispute, a person's interest in the subject and the effect that decision might have on that interest. It is reasonable to expect that a person who would be directly and seriously affected by a decision should participate in the hearing. 44 A decision to remove an athlete from a team for which he or she has qualified and been selected is clearly such a decision. This has been confirmed in several cases, one in which the court asked that the affected athlete be given notice of the proceeding and be represented at it, 45 and another in which the court allowed the affected parties (which in this case was the team in its entirety, as any one of them might have been adversely affected) to be represented by counsel and to participate in the proceedings.
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Conclusion
In this article we set out the main legal principles underlying decisionmaking within sport associations. It was noted that the key principles articulated by Lord Denning in the Lee decision are widely accepted within the sport jurisprudence: however, we observed that there has been little detailed analysis of how these principles should be applied across the wide range of circumstances facing amateur sport.
Leaving this task for future study, we reviewed 30 sport selection disputes. These were compiled in order to provide guidance to adjudicators dealing specifically with Canadian selection disputes on the eve of the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games. Our review enabled us to identify five recurring themes of interest to adjudicators that reflected Denning's principles and their application. This review was largely descriptive: it is clear that analytical work is necessary to determine how these principles translate in the sport setting, and to test their relevance and usefulness to decision-makers and sport associations. 
